Research Area: | Research Publication | Year: | 2006 | ||
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Type of Publication: | Technical Report | Keywords: | Decentralized, Design, Under, Uncertainty, Investigating, Impact, Designer, Mistakes | ||
Authors: | Gurnani, Ashwin | ||||
Abstract: | The design of products and processes within a decentralized design framework requires
different design teams or distributed subsystems to solve their local optimization problems
and pass their optimal designs to the other subsystems. It is common for subsystems to not
cooperate with each other by sharing objective or gradient information and the only
information communicated between subsystems is the values of coupled design variables.
Non local design variables are treated as constraints in local subsystem optimization. The
subsystems iterate by communicating design variable values back and forth until they all
converge upon a solution. For subsystems with multiple, conflicting objectives, the
converged solution lies at the intersection of the Rational Reaction Set and is called the “Nash
Equilibrium”. It is known that the Nash Equilibrium solution is rarely Pareto optimal, the
ideal solution set for multiobjective optimization problems. A common assumption in design
decision making is that the designer makes no errors in the selection of the optimal design in
the iterative process. In this paper, a framework for distributed design is presented that
preserves the general assumptions of non cooperation between subsystems but models
mistakes made by designers in the selection of optimal designs. It is assumed that the
designers of the initial decision making subsystem within the decentralized design process
make errors in selecting the optimal design. A set based approach is used to model these
errors which are then propagated through the design process. Subsystems utilize
metamodeling techniques to develop approximations of the non local rational reaction sets
which are then used to determine a representation of the non local objective functions. It is
seen that solutions from this modified decentralized design framework are better than the
Nash Equilibrium. The proposed framework includes concepts from game theory,
uncertainty modeling, error propagation, set based design and metamodeling techniques. |
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Comments: | Multidisciplinary Analysis and Optimization Conference |
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Full text: Gurnani.AIAA.2006.pdf
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